Who Should Control Government Information?
Emile J. Katz
Abstract
This Article argues that the high risk of politically driven manipulation of data collected by agencies within the executive branch—combined with the Supreme Court’s growing embrace of the Unitary Executive Theory—undermines the credibility of federal data and weakens Congress’s institutional capacity. It proposes moving the government’s core statistical functions that are currently located in the executive branch to congressional statistical agencies, insulated by bipartisan appointment and removal, fixed terms, and professional standards. The Article demonstrates that shifting these functions to congressional statistical agencies would improve data availability and accuracy, increase public trust, and strengthen Congress’s capacity. Furthermore, the Article explains that moving statistical agencies to Congress is consistent with actions taken by Congress in the past, that it can be implemented without violating the Constitution’s separation of powers, and that it would be politically feasible.
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Author information:
Emile J. Katz
Assistant Professor of Law, New England Law
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Recommended citation:
Emile J. Katz, Who Should Control Government Information?, 1 Indep. L.J. 231 (2026)